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Abstract. This study examines the impact of various forms of economic freedom 
and various dimensions of governance, as well as a number of economic factors, 
on economic growth among OECD nations. The study period runs from 2004 
through 2007. Panel least squares estimation finds that the natural log of per 
capita purchasing-power-parity adjusted real GDP in OECD nations is positively 
impacted by business freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, and property 
rights security. Economic growth is found to be negatively affected by perceived 
government corruption while being positively impacted by both control of 
corruption and political stability. Other findings indicate that higher unemployment 
rates and higher long term nominal interest rates inhibit economic growth, while 
net export growth enhances economic growth.   
 
Introduction 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted to investigate the linkage between 
economic freedom and economic growth. Most of these studies conclude that 
there exists a positive impact of various measures of economic freedom on 
economic growth (Barro, 1997; De Haan and Siermann, 1998; De Haan and 
Sturm, 2000; Heckelman and Stroup, 2000). Other studies have found that 
governance influences economic growth (Akcay, 2006; Brito-Bigott, Faria, 
Rodriguez, and Sanchez, 2008).  
 
This study focuses on the relationship between economic growth on the 
one hand and both good governance and economic freedom on the other hand in 
a somewhat different framework than most previous related studies. In particular, 
in light of the de facto global recession currently being experienced, the OECD is 
working with the world’s governments and other organizations to get economies 
back on the path of economic expansion and stabilization. As a central part of 
this effort, the OECD strongly takes the position that governments must be 
cautious not to jeopardize economic freedom and/or good governance as they 
seek ways in which to get their economies healthy again. In other words, nations 
must continue to support and promote good governance and economic freedom  
(OECD, 2009). The concern in this context is that the abandonment of economic 
freedoms and/or good governance will result over time in diminished economic 
growth and thus lead to a deeper and longer world economic slowdown. 
 
The purpose of this empirical study is to test the joint hypothesis that 
governance and economic freedom both influence real economic growth. The 
latter is measured in this study by natural log of the PPP (purchasing-power-
parity)-adjusted per capita real GDP. Given that the OECD is expressly 
concerned over this issue, the framework for the study consists of the nations 
that comprise the OECD. The PLS (panel least squares) estimation applies for 
the four-year period 2004 through 2007. 
 
The Framework 
 
This study focuses on economic growth among the OECD member countries for 
the period 2004-2007. Economic growth is measured as the natural log of per 
capita real GDP over the study period; log RPCY, made comparable across 
nations by PPP (purchasing power parity) adjustments. In turn, in principle 
following a number of studies focused upon economic growth (Cebula, 1978, 
1995; Barro, 1997), it is hypothesized that economic growth depends upon (a) 
various forms of economic freedom (FREEDOM), (b) various forms of good 
governance (GOODGOV), as well as (c) a number of purely economic factors 
(ECON), such that: 
 
log RPCYpppj = f(FREEDOMj, GOODGOVj, ECONj)     (1) 
 
where:   
logRPCYpppj = the natural log of the purchasing-power-parity adjusted per capita 
real GDP in OECD nation j;  
FREEDOMj refers to values of economic freedom measures in nation j; 
GOODGOVj refers to values of good (or bad) governance measures in nation j; 
and ECONj refers to economic factors in nation j. 
 
 There are five forms of economic freedom considered in this analysis. The 
first considered here is trade freedom. Trade freedom (TF) reflects the openness 
of an economy to imports of goods and services from other nations as well as the 
ability of citizens to interact freely as sellers and buyers in the international 
marketplace. The second economic freedom considered in this study is business 
freedom (BF), which reflects the individual’s right to freely conduct 
entrepreneurial activities, e.g., starting and operating a business firm without 
government interference. The third economic freedom studied here is monetary 
freedom (MF), which is illustrated by a stable currency and system of market-
determined pricing. Citizens need a stable and reliable monetary system 
(currency) to serve as both a reliable medium of exchange and store of value 
(wealth). Property rights (PR), which is another form of economic freedom, 
constitute a moving force in the quest to accumulate private property in a market-
driven environment. Secure property rights provide people the confidence to 
undertake entrepreneurial activities, to save, and to invest (Goldsmith, 1995; 
Heckelman, 2000). The fifth economic freedom measure considered here is 
GSF, government size freedom. The GSF index measures the extent to which 
the private sector of an economy is free from the burden of excessive 
government expenditures (which are often justified in terms of public goods 
provided allegedly more efficiently by the “state” rather than by the market or 
justified in terms of correcting alleged “market failures”). This dimension of 
government size is often associated with “crowding out” (Carlson and Spencer, 
1975, Cebula, 1978). The GSF index also reflects the degree to which the private 
sector is insulated from government tax burdens. Following the related literature 
to date, it is expected (ceteris paribus) that economic growth is an increasing 
function of each one of these economic freedom measures: 
 
fTF > 0, fBF > 0, fMF > 0, fPR > 0, fGSF > 0      (2)  
 
 There are three dimensions of governance included in this study. They are 
control of corruption (CORRCONTR), political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism (POLSTAB), and perceived government corruption 
(PERCORR). To begin, it is observed that “corruption” is defined essentially in 
general terms as the misuse of public power for private gain (Akcay, 2006).  
 
The CORRCONTR dimension of governance is an index measuring the 
extent to which government limits the exercise of power by non-elected 
government officials for personal gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as control of state powers by private interests. The greater the 
degree in which corruption is controlled, the greater the incentive to invest and 
participate in private enterprise; hence the greater the extent of potential 
economic growth, ceteris paribus. The POLSTAB dimension of governance is an 
index indicating the likelihood that government will not be destabilized by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including acts of terrorism. The higher the 
value of this index, the greater the likelihood that the private sector investment 
will occur and that private enterprise will flourish, thereby resulting in greater 
economic growth, ceteris paribus. Finally, the PERCORR variable is an index 
reflecting the perception by the private sector that elected government officials 
are corrupt. This index is a separate measure of corruption, namely, corruption 
among elected government officials, and the degree to which governments, even 
democratic ones, continue to be corruptly controlled by same. Clearly, the 
greater the magnitude of this index, the less the incentive to assume risks of 
investment by the private sector; hence the slower should be the rate of 
economic growth, ceteris paribus. Based upon the arguments stated above, the 
following is to be expected: 
 
f CORRCONTR > 0, fPOLSTAB > 0, fPERCORR < 0     (3) 
 
     This analysis controls for purely economic determinants of economic 
growth by adopting three economic variables. These variables take the following 
forms: LR, the nominal long term interest rate; UR, the percentage 
unemployment rate of the labor force; and NXY, growth of net exports, 
expressed as a percent of GDP (Cebula, 1995; Barro, 1997). Presumably, 
economic growth is a decreasing function of LR since a higher long term interest 
rate acts to discourage investment in new plant and equipment as well as new 
residential construction, ceteris paribus. Similarly, a higher UR implies a slower 
rate of economic growth because a higher percentage of the labor force is 
unemployed. Finally, a higher NXY implies a higher rate of real domestic 
production, ceteris paribus. Hence, it follows that: 
 
fLR < 0, fUR < 0, fNXY > 0        (4) 
 
Based on the variables identified above, equation (1) is rewritten as: 
 
log RPCYpppj = f(TF, BF, MF, PR, GSF, CORRCONTR, POLSTAB, PERCORR, 
LR, UR, NXY)         (5) 
 
Empirical Results 
 
Based on (5), the following semi-log model is to be estimated: 
 
log RPCYpppjt = a0 + a1 TFjt + a2 BFjt  + a3 MFjt + a4 PRjt + a5 GSFjt   
+ a6 CORRCONTRjt + a7 POLSTABjt + a8 PERCORRjt + a9 LRjt  + a10 URjt  
+ a11 NXYjt + u         (6) 
 
where  
log RPCYpppjt = the natural log of the purchasing-power-parity adjusted real per 
capita GDP in nation j; 
a0 = constant; 
TFjt= the value the trade freedom index in nation j, year t; 
BFjt= the value of the business freedom index in nation j, year t; 
MFjt = the value of the monetary freedom index in nation j, year t; 
PRjt = the value of the property rights index in nation j, year t; 
GSFjt = the value of the freedom from excessive government index in nation j, 
year t; 
CORRCONTRjt = the value of the control of corruption index among government 
officials in nation j, year t; 
POLSTABjt = the value of the index of political stability in nation j, year t; 
PERCORRjt = the value of the index of perceived corruption of elected 
government officials in nation j, year t; 
LRjt = the percentage nominal long run interest rate in nation j, year t; 
URjt = the percentage unemployment rate of the civilian labor force in nation j, 
year t; 
NXYjt = the growth of the ratio of net exports to the GDP in nation j, year t; 
u = stochastic error term; 
where t = 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and j =1,…30. 
 
 The data sources for the variables in the analysis are, as follows:  
log RPCYpppjt, IMF (2008); freedom indices, TF,BF, MF, PR, GSF, Heritage 
Foundation (2008); governance indices, CORRCONTR, POLSTAB, PERCORR, 
World Bank (2009); and explanatory economic variables, LR, UR, and NXY, 
OECD (2008).  
 
 The PLS (panel least squares) estimate of equation (6) using the White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity correction, is provided by equation (7): 
 
log RPCYpppjt = 1.6 + 0.011 TFjt + 0.007 BFjt  + 0.026 MFjt + 0.012 PRjt  
     (+2.48)         (+2.34)           (+2.54)        (+2.28) 
 
+ 0.002 GSFjt + 0.467 CORRCONTRjt + 0.167 POLSTABjt – 0.25 PERCORRjt  
(+1.20)  (+2.13)        (+2.08)     (-2.63) 
 
- 0.11 LRjt - 0.031 URjt + 0.545 NXYjt,    
(-3.14)         (-2.47)      (+2.88)   
 
R2 = 0.84, adjR2 = 0.82, F = 48.98      (7) 
 
where terms in parentheses are t-values. In equation (7), the estimated 
coefficients on all 11 of the explanatory variables exhibit the expected signs, and 
ten are statistically significant at beyond the five percent level. The R2 is 0.84, so 
that the model explains approximately five-sixths of the variation in the 
dependent variable. The F-statistic is statistically significant at the one percent 
level, attesting to the overall strength of the model. 
 
 Based on the PLS results in equation (7), the economic growth rate (as 
measured) in OECD nations over the 2004 through 2007 study period is an 
increasing function of TF, BF, MF, PR, CORRCONTR, POLSTAB, and NXY, 
while being a decreasing function of PERCORR, LR and UR. Only the coefficient 
on the variable GSF fails to be statistically significant at the ten percent level.  
 
Thus, economic growth in these nations over the study period was 
positively a function of economic freedom, as measured by TF, BF, MR, and PR. 
Accordingly, economic growth is greater with higher levels of trade freedom, 
business freedom, monetary freedom, and a more secure system of property 
rights protection. These findings are consistent with nearly all of the existing 
literature on the relationship between economic growth and economic freedom 
(Barro, 1997; De Haan and Siermann, 1998; De Haan and Sturm, 2000; 
Heckelman and Stroup, 2000).  
 
Economic growth also is found to beneficially impacted by “positive” forms 
of governance in the forms of control of corruption (CORRCONTR) and political 
stability (POLSTAB). Not surprisingly, the perception of greater corruption of 
elected government officials acts to retard economic growth. Clearly, the PLS 
findings summarized in equation (7) indicate that in addition to traditionally 
recognized forms of economic freedom, governance effectiveness vis-à-vis free 
markets promotes economic growth. 
Naturally, economic influences play a significant role in economic growth.  
According to equation (7), economic growth in this grouping of nations was 
negatively impacted by both higher nominal long term interest rates (LR) and 
higher unemployment rates (UR), while being positively impacted by export 
growth (NXY). These latter findings are compatible with previous research 
(Cebula, 1995; Barro, 1997). 
 
 Of these findings, the result for variable TF may be of particular relevance 
to the policy concerns of the IMF (2009). In particular, the OECD Secretary-
General Angel Gurria (OECD, 2009) has recently stressed that “We must ensure 
that today’s policies to manage the crisis not be the source of tomorrow’s 
problems…Governments must resist protectionism and keep markets open to 
competition as they seek ways to get their economies going again.” In other 
words, the findings in this empirical study confirm that trade freedom is an 
important source of economic growth and thus should not be abandoned. 
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